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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y  
O F F I C E O F N A T I O N A L E S T I M A T E S

13 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ESTIMATES STAFF

FROM: Chief, Estimates Staff  
SUBJECT: Initiation of NIE-42

The National Estimates Board has approved initiation of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-42) on "The Current Situation in Albania, with Particular Reference to Greek, Yugoslav and Italian Interests and Pretensions." This estimate supersedes Staff Planning Project No. 21, cancelled 10 August 1951.

Priority:

25X1A9a

Task Team: [REDACTED]



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AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 12 MAR 81 REVIEWER: 018557

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD

VIA: Chief, Estimates Staff

25X1A9a  
FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Planning Project #21 "The Current Situation in Albania,  
with Particular Reference to Greek, Yugoslav and Italian  
Interests and Pretensions"

1. Attached are draft terms of reference for Planning Project #21. There are several aspects to this problem which the Board should probably consider before deciding upon the action to be taken on this subject. 25X1X4A

[REDACTED]

3. The problem, by its nature, has to be considered in somewhat artificial terms. Conflicting Yugoslav, Greek and Italian interests in Albania would only become critical in the event of Hoxha's fall from power, and most observers agree that there is little immediate prospect of this. The problem is matter of current concern, however, in that mutual suspicions, even at the present stage, could be an obstacle to a coordinated defense effort. Although no substantial steps have been taken toward the coordination of Yugoslav, Italian and Greek military plans, this is a logical step in the Western defense effort and an intelligence study such as this might well be of considerable value in that connection.

4. A key factor in the Albanian resistance problem is the attitude of Yugoslavia. As indicated in Staff Memorandum 89, Western observers in Belgrade do not anticipate any early Yugoslav attempt to develop a pro-Tito movement in Albania, largely for fear of inviting

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Soviet or satellite intervention. Should Western and Yugoslav strength develop as planned, however, reducing the Soviet threat in Southeastern Europe, Tito can hardly be expected to continue to refrain from efforts to orient Albania towards Yugoslavia. In the interim period, it would obviously be to U.S. advantage for Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy to reach some understanding with regard to Albania. An intelligence estimate of the situation might emphasize this desirability to the policy planners.

5. We have limited this project to a consideration of Greek, Italian and Yugoslav interests as they relate to Western security and have excluded consideration of Soviet reaction to possible developments in Albania. This was done in the belief that consideration of the Soviet reaction would require the examination of broader problems which might obscure the question of possible conflicts of interest among Yugoslav, Greece and Italy and their bearing on Western defense planning for the Mediterranean.

6. It is recommended that this project be scheduled as an NIE and also that OPC be requested to participate.

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Attachment

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 July 1951

SUBJECT: Planning Project #21: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN  
ALBANIA, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GREEK,  
YUGOSLAV AND ITALIAN INTERESTS AND PRETENSIONS

THE PROBLEM

*Albanian*

To examine the current situation with regard to Albania  
~~To analyze the character and intent of Greek, Italian and Yugoslav~~  
and to estimate the degree to which Greek, Italian and Yugoslav  
interests in Albanian conflict, and to assess the significance of  
conflicting interests as obstacles to the effective defense of  
Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

SCOPE

This project should examine the stability of the Hoxha regime  
in Albania, the strength of its ties with the Soviet Union, and  
the nature and extent of resistance activities within Albania.  
The possible sponsorship of such activity by Yugoslavia, Italy  
and Greece should be examined and the degree to which the interests  
of these three countries conflict should be evaluated. The signi-

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ficance of such conflicting interests as obstacles to the creation of an effective defense of Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean should be assessed A) on the assumption that the Hoxha regime remains in power, and B) on the assumption that the Hoxha regime is overthrown.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

I. WHAT IS THE CURRENT INTERNAL SITUATION IN ALBANIA?

- A. Is the Hoxha regime firmly established politically?
  - 1. Are there any significant divisions among the top leadership?
  - 2. Are the police and armed forces under firm political control?
- B. To what extent does the regime's existence depend on Soviet support?
  - 1. What Soviet support and direction is necessary and how much is being provided?
  - 2. What military or political agreements exist between Albania and the USSR or the other satellites?
- C. What resistance to the regime exists and how effective is it?

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1. What specific resistance groups exist and what are their methods of operation?
2. Is there cooperation between resistance groups?
3. What are the political goals of various resistance groups?
4. What is the relationship between resistance groups in Albania and emigre movements in Italy, Greece or Yugoslavia and what is the extent of support provided by those three governments?

**II. DO THE INTERESTS OF YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE AND ITALY IN ALBANIA CONFLICT AND, IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?**

- A. What is the historical background of the interests of these three countries in Albania?
- B. What kind of a solution to the Albanian problem would each of these countries desire?  
→
- C. To what extent would each of these three countries compromise in the interests of obtaining a mutually agreed solution?  
C. Are there clearly defined conflicts of interest between the three countries under present conditions?
  1. What effect do such conflicts have on relations between the three countries?

C. What measures are these three countries now taking to prevent  
the interests, either through Albanian emigre groups or  
other means?

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2. Are such conflicts of interest or mutual suspicion obstacles to effective political and military cooperation among the three countries?

**III. ASSUMING THAT THE HOXA REGIME RETAINS POWER IN ALBANIA, ARE CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF ITALY, YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE IN ALBANIA OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN?**

- A. What is the degree and nature of cooperation between Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece desirable for effective defense of this area?
- B. What steps, if any, are currently being taken to coordinate the defense plans of these countries?
- C. What effect does Albania in hostile hands have on the defensive plans of each country?
- D. To what extent do the interests and pretensions of the three countries in Albania influence their military planning and to what extent does this complicate the development of a coordinated defense?

**IV. ASSUMING THAT THE HOXA REGIME IS OVERTHROWN, WHAT EFFECT WILL POSSIBLE CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF ITALY, YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE HAVE ON THE SECURITY OF THAT AREA?**

- (Under such circumstances that USSR finds it impractical to intervene)*
- A. In the event of the overthrow of the Hoxha regime, how

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actively would each of the three countries attempt to influence the nature of the regime to follow?

1. Would such activity be likely to result in open hostilities among any of the three countries?
  2. Given present trends, what would be the nature of the most probable successor regime?
- B. What changes in the relations of the three countries would be caused by the replacement of the Hoxha regime?
1. What changes in the military plans of each country would be necessitated by such an event?
  2. Would such changes facilitate or obstruct the development of military and political cooperation among the three countries?
- C. What would be the effect of a change in the Albanian regime on the prospects for the development of an effective coordinated defense of Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean?

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